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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE
TO AN ACTION FOR FRAUD
Judicial indifference to the perpetration of frauds seemed
to be common during the early years of American jurispru-
dence. Here and there would be heard a voice, as of one cry-
ing in a wilderness of loose legal thought and absence of in-
terest in the problems of the defrauded, bemoaning the exist-
ence making the defrauder immune to all actions for dam-
ages. Now and then there would be a decision showing sym-
pathy with the defrauded and a genuine desire to help him
by means of a truly reasonable judgment. Happily, as time
has gone on, more and more courts have shown a willingness
to help the defrauded by allowing cold-blooded legal prin-
ciples to work their perfectly reasonable and logical results
upon the defrauder.
Most clearly demonstrative of the calloused attitude of
early courts toward fraud cases was the almost continual re-
citing of the "duty" of a person to keep himself from being
defrauded. If courts had been accustomed to talk frankly of
"contributory negligence" as a defense to actions for fraud
and deceit, they would have brought themselves and their
absurd attitude out into the open for the public criticism that'
they so richly deserved; but they commonly avoided any
such patent approval of a rule that would have been ground-
ed in a principle of immunity of a wilful wrongdoer in all
cases in which it might be held that plaintiff might have pre-
vented his loss by keeping out of defendant's way.
In contrast with the somewhat rigid governing of business
under the earlier absolute monarchies of modern Europe and
with the less rigid but still pronounced regulation and taxing
of business by Europe's limited monarchies of about 1800,
American liberals contended for and succeeded in getting, in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a rather
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high degree of what the French call laissez-faire,1 a rather
loose type of governing, characterized chiefly by scantiness
of control of -business by government. In the direction of
easy-going government, the laissez-faire policy of govern-
ment was probably, on the whole, more loose than the origi-
nal Latin expression for laissez-faire, laxare facere, was in-
tended to indicate, for it seemed to tend more and more to
indicate, in the first half of the nineteenth century, an al-
most complete liberty in the American citizen to do what-
ever he would. Of course, on the whole, and especially in the
cities and the portions of the country that had been settled
for the longest time, the grosser crimes were usually punished
by government through legal process; but, in rural and new-
ly settled areas, while such crimes as murder and horse-steal-
ing were usually punished, either by legal action or other-
wise, there was often a strange and unreasoning apathy to-
ward such wrongs as the commission of frauds, even where
the facts were such as to show a very plain type of swindle.
It seems that the early American attitude toward the or-
dinary case of swindling was that of "rugged American in-
dividualism," i.e., "Every man for himself and the devil
take the hindmost." Apparently, if the poor plaintiff had
been swindled out of his entire estate, popular opinion, as
reflected in the courts of the time was: "He made one for-
tune, which he has now lost. Now let him make another
fortune, especially considering the fact that he can simply
move farther west and get some -more land at a dollar and a
quarter an acre. The plaintiff should have been more careful
about looking into the facts before he fell for the talk of the
defendant. Why should the court take care of the interests
of a fool who has not the sense to take care of his own money
and property?"
1 Laissez-faire - government abstention from interference with individual ac-
tion, especially in commerce. -Concise Oxford Dictionary.
Laissez-faire - (Fr., to let alone, or let act; Latin, laxare, to relax, and facere,
to do, act.) A letting alone; noninterference, applied to that policy of government
which allows the people to govern themselves as much as possible, and without
much interference from -their rulers. Webster's Universal Unabridged Dictionary.
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Many of the cases cited on this denial of rights have
sought to put upon the defrauded person a "duty" to in-
vestigate and thus to avoid being defrauded. Only a few of
such cases are reviewed in the appended footnote.' Thought-
2 The fact that the plaintiff had not exercised what the court regarded as
proper diligence was considered material in Schwabacker v. Riddle, 99 Ill. 343
(1881).
Probably among the cases most offensive to a modem sense of justice is Sher-
wood v. Salmon, 2 Day'(Conn.) 128 (1805), in which the court treated the cases
as a proper one for the application of the rule of caveat emptor, despite glowing
accounts given by the defrauder to the defrauded, in regard to lands 500 miles
away, which the court says the defrauded should have investigated, though, in
1794, when the facts arose, a trip to examine the land would have taken weeks
and would have occasioned very great expense and difficulty. Of course, under more
recent holdings, it is not usual to try to impose upon the defrauded a "duty" to
examine lands at a great distance. Dunn v. White, 63 Mo. 181 (1876).
Some of the cases that seem, at first glance, to impose a "duty" to keep from
being defrauded, may be sustained on other grounds. E. g., Osborne v. Missouri
Pacific Ry. Co., 71 Neb. 180, 98 N. W. 685 (1904), where it is decided that a
person having both the capacity and the opportunity to read a release of claims
for damages for personal injuries, signed by himself, and not prevented by any
fraud from reading it, relying upon what the other party said about the writing
and therefore failing to read it, is estopped by his own negligence from asserting
that the release is not legal and binding upon him according to its terms. It is al-
ways to be remembered that one strong reason for a decision against the allegedly
defrauded party in any such case is the powerful tendency of courts to endeavor
to give something of finality to the signed contract of the parties, unless there be
a clear and equitable reason for doing otherwise, especially where the parties are
dealing at arm's length, as they are ordinarily doing in the effecting of a settle-
ment of a claim for damages.
Boddy v. Henry, 113 Iowa 462, 85 N. W. 771, 53 L. R. A. 769 (1901), which
stresses -the fact that plaintiff had means of knowledge by which he could have
determined the falsity of the representations, is not strong authority for the propo-
sition that the plaintiff must show that he has exercised due diligence in ascertaining
the facts, for the reason that plaintiff failed to show that defendant himself had
knowledge of the falsity of the representations.
Whitman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 S. C. 200, 92 S. E. 861, L. R. A.
1917F, 717 (1917), mentions plaintiff's abundant opportunity to ascertain the
truth, but stresses the fact that there was no proof that defendant's representations
were fraudulently made.
In 'Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S. 247, 8 S. Ct. 881, 31 L. Ed.
678 (1888), complainant sought to rescind a contract for purchase of real estate
on the ground of fraudulent representation by seller, the court said: "Where the
purchaser undertakes to make investigations of his own, and the vendor does noth-
ing to prevent his investigation from being as full as he chooses to make it, the
purchaser cannot afterwards allege that the vendor made misrepresentations." But,
when one examines the case carefully, itappears that the principal ground for
denying relief to complainant is that the necessary elements of fraud are not
proved by the evidence.
Pigott v. Graham, 48 Wash. 348, 93 P. 435, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1176 (1908),
presents the somewhat unusual phenomenon of a case in which the decision for
defendant is seemingly placed squarely, upon the ground of plaintiff's failure to
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ful textwriters have called attention to the weakness of the
position of cases treating contributory negligence as being
a vailid defense to fraud cases.'
investigate the faots, when he might have done so, but it also appears that such
investigation would have been much easier than it would have been in many cases.
Held, that, where the buyer, who asserts that she was fraudulently charged $1
more than the sum total of her purchases, made no effort -to ascertain the correct-
ness of the bill at the time when she paid it, but willingly paid sum charged, to
secure evidence on which to base a suit for fraud against store and its employee,
buyer could not recover for fraud, as a plaintiff cannot recover for fraud and de-
ceit unless it is shown that she was deceived by false representations and relied up-
on them to her damage. Shaw v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 115 F. 2d 684 (CCA 4th,
1940).
3 "Not only must there be reliance, but the reliance must be found tg be
justifiable under the circumstances. The plaintiff's conduct must not be so entirely
unreasonable, in the light of the information open to him, that the law may
properly say that his loss is his own responsibility. In some cases, of course, the
unreasonableness of his conduct has been regarded as sufficient evidence .that he
did not in fact rely upon the representation - he may testify .to his reliance, but
the court or the jury is not compelled to believe him. But in many cases where the
plaintiff's reliance and good faith are unquestioned, it may still be held that his
conduct was so foolish as to bar his recovery. He may not put faith in representa-
tions which are so preposterous, or which are shown by facts within his observa-
tion to be so patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes to
avoid the discovery of the truth, and still compel the defendant to be responsible
for his loss.
"There have been cases (citing Dunn v. White, and Osborne v. Missouri Pacific
R. Co., both cited supra, in note 2), in which it was said that such reliance is con-
tributory negligence, and that the plaintiff must exercise the care of a reasonably
prudent man for his own protection. Undoubtedly such language is appropriate if
the defendant's mispresentation itself is merely negligent; but where there is an
intent to mislead, it is clearly inconsistent with the general rule that mere negligence
of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort. The better reasoned cases
have rejected contributory negligence as a defense applicable to intentional deceit,
taking account of -the effect which the representation is intended to have upon the
plaintiff's mind. It is a sufficient indication that the person deceived is not held to
the standard of precaution, or of minimum knowledge, of the hypothetical rea-
sonable man, that people who are exceptiormlly gulible, ignorant or dim-witted
have been allowed to recover when the defendant knew it, and deliberately took
advantage of it .... Rather than contributory negligence, the matter seems to turn
upon the knowledge which the plaintiff has, or the knowledge which may fairly be
charged against him from the facts within his observation, and so to be something
close to assumption of risk." Prosser on Torts, pp. 747-749.
"It is sometimes broadly stated that the failure of the plaintiff to use ordinary
care to discover the falsity of the defendant's representation is a bar to legal re-
lief. (Referring to Sherwood v. Salmon, cited supra, note 2.) 'The maxim caveat
emptol applies forcibly to this case. The law redresses those only who use diligence
to protect themselves; such diligence as prudent men ordinarily use.' Thus stated
the rule is open to two just criticisms: (1) Since deceit is an intentional tort, it is
illogical to allow what is practically contributory negligence to be a defense (Stein-
metz v. Kelley, 72 Ind. 442 (1880), and (2) that it ought to be the policy of the
law -to protect the weak and credulous - to protect the fool against the knave.
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Even today, some courts say that, where the facts are
equally available to plaintiff and to defendant, plaintiff
should have investigated.4
The modern tendency is rather distinctly away from hold-
ing contributory negligence to be a defense to an action in
fraud and deceit,5 which is an entirely logical development,
when one considers the long recognized fact that there is no
such defense to any action for a wilful tort.
"There is a class of cases, however, where it is arguable that the plaintiff should
be barred, not exactly because of contributory negligence, but on the ground that
he cannot be believed when he says that he believed - namely, where the facts
were open to his immediate observation, where .the parties were on an equal foot-
ing and the plaintiff was not -thrown off his guard. But even this suggestion is
open to the criticism that if the defendant actually intended to deceive, he should
not be allowed to say to the plaintiff that -the latter was a fool to believe him even
if the facts were obvious." Clark on Torts, 74.
4 Kneer v. Baruch Corporation, 118 P. 2d 488 (Cal. App. 1941).
5 Where title is fraudulently represented to be clear of all incumbrances, plain-
tiff was held not to be under a "duty" -to investigate the public records in order
to find ithat there was an incumbrance by trust deed. Brown v. Oxtoby, 114 P.
2d 622, 624 (Cal. App. 1941); Angers v. Sabatineii, 293 N. W. 173 (Wis. 1940).
Held, that a vendor was not precluded from recovering for fraudulent repre-
sentations by defendant that he had arranged with purchaser's administrator to
loan to purchaser's estate the sum necessary to enable the estate to take advantage
of a waiver provision in the contract of sale, which representations induced vendor
to extend the -time of the waiver provision and to sign the deed and assign con-
tract to defendant, because vendor signed the deed on advice of counsel, where the
attorney for the purchaser's estate represented in a letter that tha defendant was
lending money to the estate and defendant assured counsel of such loan, and hence
counsel was not required to make an investigation as to the truth of the matter.
Petersen v. Graham, 110 P. 2d 149 (Washington, 1941).
Held, that, where grantor, who was in a position to know the location of lots
sold by him, sold specifically described lot -to grantee and pointed out a certain lot
as the lot sold and grantee without availing himself of information in public
records built dwelling upon lot which was pointed out by grantor, but which was
in fact property of another and not the one sold, grantor was liable for fraud
notwithstanding grantee's negligence in failing -to avail himself of public records.
Pattridge v. Yourmans, 109 P. 2d 646 (Colorado, 1941).
"Contributory negligence is not a defense to an action based on fraud. If a
false statement is made by one who may be fairly assumed to know what he is
talking about, it may be accepted as true, without question and without inquiry,
although the means of correct information are in reach." H. D. Sojourner & Co. v.
Joseph, 191 S. W. 418, 422 (Mississippi, 1939), quoting Nash Mississippi Valley
Motor Co. v. Childress, 156 Miss. 157, 125 So. 708, 709.
"Upon the question of fraudulent representation the rule is that when the
statement of fact is assumed to be within the knowledge of the person making it
(and the amended bill here so discloses), the other has the right to rely on its
truth, and in the absence of anything to arouse suspicion is not bound to make
inquiry or examine for himself." Franklin v. Nunnelley, 5 So. 2d 99, 101 (Alabama,
1941).
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Today, as far as the courts are concerned, the principle of
laissez-faire in fraud cases is almost dead. Undoubtedly a
great majority of the general public would favor rather strict
government control for the prevention of some of the larger
frauds, such as have often been perpetrated by corporations
and promoters - forms of fraud now sought to be prevented
by the federal S. E. C. enactment giving special attention to
stock exchange problems. How strong and how dangerous a
hold too rugged an individualism and laissez-faire may still
have upon many Americans is well indicated by the apparent-
ly moderately strong movement in Congress to repeal or
emasculate the S.E.C. statute, which is mainly an act to pre-
vent a repetition of some of the rank swindles of the past in
the field of corporations, although this legislation had the ap-
proval of the national platforms of both major political par-
ties in 1940. Apparently we have, even in Congress, a con-
siderable element who would like to see reopened the old op-
portunities for various types of frauds upon uninformed or-
dinary members of the general public.
Ralph S. Bauer.
De Paul University.
"A person is justified in relying on a representation made to him in all cases
where the representation is a positive statement of fact, and where an investiga-
tion would be required to discover the truth." Sic v. Loup River Public Power
District, 286 N. W. 700, 704 (Nebraska, 1939) quoting Perry v. Rogers, 62 Neb.
898, 87 N. W. 1063.
